Publication status: Unpublished opinion. The California Court of Appeal filed its decision on November 4, 2026, and modified it on November 5 without changing the judgment. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, unpublished appellate opinions generally may not be cited or relied upon as precedent, subject to specified exceptions. This article discusses the decision as an illustration of established California anti-SLAPP and contract principles, not as binding authority.
A television production company develops a new series after negotiations over a proposed reboot of an earlier show fail. The owner of contractual rights in the earlier series contends that the new production violates an agreement restricting sequels, remakes, and derivative works. The defendants respond that producing a television program is protected expressive activity and seek dismissal under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
That dispute reached the California Court of Appeal in Roadrunner JMTC LLC v. Warner Bros. Television (Nov. 4, 2026, B344915).
The case concerns two well-known medical dramas, ER and The Pitt, but the legal issues extend beyond the entertainment industry. They involve the enforcement of contractual restrictions against protected activity, the evidence necessary to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion, and the knowledge and intent required to establish intentional interference with contractual relations.
The appellate court allowed the contractual claims against Warner Bros. Television to proceed but concluded that the claims against several other defendants should be stricken.
The court did not decide whether The Pitt actually breached the agreement.
The 1994 Agreement and the Dispute Over The Pitt
Michael Crichton, whose work helped create the television series ER, entered into an agreement with Warner Bros. Television in 1994.
The agreement included a provision commonly described as a “frozen rights” clause. It restricted the production of sequels, remakes, spin-offs, and other works derived from ER without the required approval.
Following Crichton’s death, the relevant contractual rights passed to Roadrunner JMTC LLC, an entity controlled by his widow, Sherri Crichton.
Years later, Warner Bros. and other individuals involved in the original series discussed the possibility of developing a new ER production. Those discussions did not result in an agreement with Roadrunner.
Warner Bros. subsequently proceeded with The Pitt, another medical drama involving physicians and staff working under pressure in an emergency department.
Roadrunner alleged that The Pitt was effectively an unauthorized continuation or derivative production of ER, notwithstanding its different title and characters.
It sued Warner Bros. Television for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Roadrunner also sued other individuals and entities involved in producing or distributing The Pitt, including John Wells, Noah Wyle, R. Scott Gemmill, and related companies, for intentional interference with contractual relations.
Those defendants were not alleged to be parties to the 1994 agreement. Their alleged liability depended on whether they knowingly interfered with the contractual obligations imposed on Warner Bros.
Why the Defendants Filed an Anti-SLAPP Motion
California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 permits a defendant to file a special motion to strike claims arising from certain protected speech or petitioning activity.
The statute generally requires a two-stage analysis.
First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by the statute.
If that showing is made, the plaintiff must demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. At this preliminary stage, the plaintiff must present a legally sufficient claim supported by evidence that, if credited, would permit a favorable judgment.
The court does not ordinarily resolve disputed factual questions or decide which side will ultimately prevail.
The defendants argued that Roadrunner’s claims arose from the creation and production of a television series, activity protected by the First Amendment and California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
The parties agreed that the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis was satisfied.
The dispute therefore centered on the second stage: whether Roadrunner had presented sufficient evidence to establish the minimal merit of its claims.
The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety.
The defendants appealed.
The Contractual Claims Against Warner Bros. Survived
The central contractual question was whether The Pitt fell within the 1994 agreement’s restriction on works derived from ER.
Warner Bros. argued that the term “derivative” should be interpreted according to its relatively technical meaning under copyright law.
Roadrunner argued for a broader interpretation based on the contractual language and the circumstances surrounding the agreement.
The distinction mattered because the contractual restriction could potentially reach conduct beyond what would independently constitute copyright infringement.
The Court of Appeal concluded that Roadrunner had presented sufficient evidence to survive the anti-SLAPP motion even under the narrower, copyright-based definition of “derivative work” advocated by Warner Bros. The court therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether the broader contractual interpretation advanced by Roadrunner was correct. This was a significant preliminary ruling in Roadrunner’s favor, although the court did not determine that The Pitt actually breached the 1994 agreement.
The court also considered evidence comparing the two productions, including their emergency-room settings, narrative structure, pacing, dialogue, and treatment of medical personnel confronting overlapping crises.
At the preliminary anti-SLAPP stage, the court concluded that Roadrunner had presented sufficient evidence to allow its contractual claims against Warner Bros. to proceed.
The ruling did not establish that The Pitt was a derivative work under the contract.
Nor did it establish copyright infringement. Roadrunner’s principal claim against Warner Bros. concerned the parties’ contractual obligations, and the meaning of those obligations remained disputed.
The decision meant that Warner Bros. had not demonstrated that the contractual claims should be eliminated through the special motion to strike.
The litigation could continue, with the parties retaining the opportunity to develop and contest the evidence in subsequent proceedings.
The Court Rejected Parts of Roadrunner’s Contract Evidence
Although Roadrunner’s contractual claims survived, the appellate court did not accept all of the evidence submitted in support of its interpretation.
The court rejected testimony concerning a participant’s undisclosed understanding of the agreement.
California contract interpretation generally focuses on the parties’ objectively manifested intent rather than a witness’s private understanding of contractual language.
The court also found portions of an industry expert’s declaration inadmissible because the testimony purported to interpret the particular contract and announce legal conclusions rather than establish a relevant industry custom or practice.
Those evidentiary rulings are significant.
A party opposing an anti-SLAPP motion cannot satisfy its burden merely by submitting declarations that express confidence in its interpretation of a contract.
The evidence must be admissible and relevant to an issue the court may properly consider.
Here, the appellate court concluded that Roadrunner’s remaining evidence was sufficient to satisfy the preliminary burden on its claims against Warner Bros.
Why the Intentional-Interference Claims Failed
The outcome was different for the defendants who were not parties to the 1994 agreement.
Roadrunner alleged that those defendants intentionally interfered with Warner Bros.’ contractual obligations by participating in the development and production of The Pitt.
Under California law, intentional interference with contractual relations generally requires proof of a valid contract, the defendant’s knowledge of that contract, intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption, an actual breach or disruption, and resulting damage.
Knowledge and intent are separate elements. Knowing that a contract exists is not the same as acting with the intent to induce its breach or disrupt its performance.
The Court of Appeal applied that distinction. As to John Wells and his production company, the court found that Roadrunner had made a prima facie showing that they knew of the agreement. It nonetheless concluded that Roadrunner had not presented sufficient evidence that they acted with the intent required for an interference claim.
As to the remaining noncontracting defendants, the court likewise concluded that Roadrunner had not made the evidentiary showing required at the second stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
Because Roadrunner failed to establish the minimal merit of the intentional-interference claims, the appellate court reversed the denial of the anti-SLAPP motion as to those defendants and directed the trial court to dismiss them.
The distinction between the defendants was therefore important.
Warner Bros. was itself a party to the agreement and faced claims concerning its own contractual obligations.
The other defendants faced tort claims requiring proof both that they knew of those obligations and that they intended to interfere with them.
Participation in the same commercial project did not make their legal positions identical, and evidence sufficient to show knowledge did not by itself establish intent.
Contractual Restrictions and Protected Expression
The case illustrates a recurring issue in commercial litigation.
Conduct may qualify as protected speech or expression while also being subject to contractual obligations voluntarily undertaken by the defendant.
For example, a business may agree to confidentiality restrictions, limits on the use of intellectual property, or conditions governing the development of particular products.
A subsequent dispute may involve activity that independently receives constitutional protection.
The existence of protected activity can trigger anti-SLAPP analysis, but it does not necessarily establish that a contract claim lacks merit.
The court must still examine the asserted contractual obligation and the evidence supporting the alleged breach.
The analysis is particularly sensitive when the contract restricts creative or expressive activity, because the court must distinguish the scope of the contractual promise from the separate question of whether the challenged work infringes intellectual property rights.
In Roadrunner, the appellate court permitted the contractual claims to continue without resolving the ultimate interpretation of the frozen rights clause or determining whether Warner Bros. had breached it.
What Businesses Can Learn From the Dispute
For businesses entering licensing, production, joint venture, or other commercial agreements, the language of contractual restrictions can become decisive years after the agreement is signed.
Terms such as “derivative work,” “related product,” or “competing business” may generate disputes if the parties do not define their intended scope.
The problem can become more complicated when a project involves individuals or companies that were not parties to the original agreement.
A contractual restriction may bind the contracting party without automatically creating liability for every third party who participates in the challenged activity.
Where a plaintiff alleges intentional interference, evidence that the third party knew of the contract is necessary but may not be sufficient. The plaintiff must also show that the third party intended to induce a breach or disrupt performance.
For litigants considering an anti-SLAPP motion, the case also demonstrates the importance of examining each cause of action and each defendant separately.
A plaintiff may have sufficient evidence to proceed against a contracting party but insufficient evidence to pursue a related tort claim against noncontracting participants.
The preliminary nature of anti-SLAPP proceedings should also be kept in mind. Surviving the motion permits a claim to continue; it does not establish liability.
An Unpublished Decision With Limited Precedential Value
Roadrunner JMTC LLC v. Warner Bros. Television is an unpublished California Court of Appeal opinion.
Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), unpublished opinions generally cannot be cited or relied upon by courts or parties, except as permitted by rule 8.1115(b).
The decision therefore should not be treated as establishing a new binding rule concerning anti-SLAPP motions, derivative works, or intentional interference with contracts.
Its practical value lies in the way the dispute illustrates established legal principles: contractual claims involving protected activity may survive an anti-SLAPP motion when supported by sufficient evidence, while related interference claims may fail if the plaintiff cannot establish both the defendant’s knowledge of the underlying agreement and the intent to interfere with it.
The appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion as to Warner Bros. Television and reversed as to the other defendants.
The underlying breach-of-contract dispute remains unresolved by that appellate ruling.
Elpis Law represents businesses and individuals in California commercial litigation, including contract disputes, shareholder litigation, business torts, and disputes involving contractual interference.
Legal Authorities
- Roadrunner JMTC LLC v. Warner Bros. Television (Nov. 4, 2026, B344915), Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Div. 3, unpublished; modified Nov. 5, 2026, without change in judgment — opinion (the court posts unpublished opinions for only 60 days; this is a stable copy)
- Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 — official text
- California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115
Related practice areas: Contracts and Business Torts · Copyright and Trademark